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ARTICLE
Local conditions and policy design determine
whether ecological compensation can achieve No
Net Loss goals
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Joseph M. Kiesecker5, Hugo M. Costa3, Leon Bennun 6, Stephen Edwards7, Hedley S. Grantham3,
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Many nations use ecological compensation policies to address negative impacts of devel-
opment projects and achieve No Net Loss (NNL) of biodiversity and ecosystem services. Yet,
failures are widely reported. We use spatial simulation models to quantify potential net
impacts of alternative compensation policies on biodiversity (indicated by native vegetation)
and two ecosystem services (carbon storage, sediment retention) across four case studies (in
Australia, Brazil, Indonesia, Mozambique). No policy achieves NNL of biodiversity in any case
study. Two factors limit their potential success: the land available for compensation (existing
vegetation to protect or cleared land to restore), and expected counterfactual biodiversity
losses (unregulated vegetation clearing). Compensation also fails to slow regional biodi-
versity declines because policies regulate only a subset of sectors, and expanding policy
scope requires more land than is available for compensation activities. Avoidance of impacts
remains essential in achieving NNL goals, particularly once opportunities for compensation
are exhausted.
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Halting biodiversity loss and securing ecosystem servicesare fundamental challenges facing humanity1. Whileindustrial development is often important for pursuing
economic goals2, it places immense pressure on ecosystems3,4. In
response, many nations have adopted ecological compensation
policies5,6 to address the negative impacts of development pro-
jects, often in an attempt to achieve “No Net Loss” (NNL) of
biodiversity and other related goals, such as securing the provi-
sion of ecosystem services valued by local people. These policies
invoke the “mitigation hierarchy”, where biodiversity losses from
development are first avoided wherever possible, then minimised
and remediated and, finally, offset to generate commensurate
biodiversity gains elsewhere7. Hundreds of compensation policies
exist worldwide8,9, including corporate standards and require-
ments set by financial institutions; yet, their contribution to
conservation goals remains uncertain at global, national and even
local scales10. Indeed, some compensation policies appear to
facilitate ongoing biodiversity losses11,12 and cause further
damage to ecosystem services13,14.
If ecological compensation is to become a cornerstone of
attempts to achieve global conservation goals15, understanding
what leads to policy success (or failure) is vital. Several factors
complicate efforts to obtain such insight. First, compensation
policies vary enormously in their design16, making it difficult to
pinpoint which factors explain differences in project outcomes.
For example, some policies focus on generating biodiversity gains
using restoration activities (“Improvement” approaches). Others
derive gains by protecting existing biodiversity (such as by
creating new or strengthening existing protected areas) on the
presumption that this prevents its future loss (“Averted Loss”
approaches). Second, the biodiversity gains generated by com-
pensation activities can vary substantially from place to place,
even for identical policies. For example, Improvement approa-
ches may be more effective when applied to highly degraded
areas located nearby well-functioning ecosystems that help
promote recovery. Further, developing realistic counterfactual
scenarios to evaluate compensation activities against is challen-
ging because biodiversity trajectories differ from place to place–
some areas experience significant loss, others natural recovery.
While many other factors likely contribute to policy success,
including governance and enforcement capacity, understanding
the specific influence of these two factors—policy design and
local conditions—will help to improve the outcomes of com-
pensation activities worldwide.
Here, we investigate how policy design and local conditions
interact to influence potential policy performance—i.e. how close
compensation comes to achieving NNL goals. While previous
research has explored specific compensation policies and out-
comes in certain locations12,17–19, ours is the first to system-
atically examine a common set of policy settings across multiple
case studies (Fig. 1), which vary in the local conditions that
potentially influence policy performance (Table 1). We bring
together the policy designs currently promoted globally8,9 to
examine 18 different options, representing combinations of two
area-based approaches to generating biodiversity gains, four types
of trades in biodiversity features between development and
compensation sites, and three methods for prioritising compen-
sation across the landscape (compensation policies often include
a combination of these activities; Fig. 2). Our policy design
options are hypothetical, yet they represent those used globally
and some also resemble those currently used or proposed in our
case study regions (see Supplementary Methods 1–4).
We use spatial simulation models to quantify impacts of both
future regulated development projects and the compensation
activities they require on biodiversity (using the extent of native
vegetation types as a proxy; see Methods section) and two
ecosystem services (carbon storage and sediment retention). Our
definition of what constitutes regulated development differs
among case studies and is based on policy trends and the
industries these policies will likely regulate in future (see Methods
section). We measure impacts of compensation relative to a
counterfactual scenario, representing the unregulated biodiversity
losses and gains (i.e. changes in vegetation extent simulated by
land use change models) likely to occur in absence of regulated
development and compensation activities; and define NNL to
occur when the impacts of compensation equal or exceed those of
development. The Methods detail our conceptual framework
(including a description of the variables being manipulated,
measured and compared among case studies), our modelling
approach (to simulate regulated development and compensation
activities, and measure impacts on biodiversity and ecosystem
services), and a discussion of assumptions and potential limita-
tions of our study. Supplementary Methods 1–4 contain case
study data, model calibration and validation results. We find that
two factors limit potential achievement of NNL of biodiversity
and ecosystem services, and even the best performing policies fail
to slow regional biodiversity declines.
Results and discussion
Overview. Not one of our investigated compensation policy
designs achieved NNL of native vegetation extent, our proxy for
biodiversity, yet some policies performed better than others did
(Fig. 2). Two local conditions explained differences in policy
performance among case studies: the extent of land available for
compensation limited our ability to protect or restore biodi-
versity, while counterfactual biodiversity losses and gains within
compensation sites limited their potential impact on biodiversity.
However, even our best performing policies did little to slow
regional biodiversity declines because compensation was only
required for a subset of development sectors and expanding
policy scope to regulate other types of development would require
more land than would be available for compensation under our
simulated development scenarios. While expanding policy scope
and increasing our set multipliers (to require more compensation
per unit impact of development) are both theoretical responses to
policy failure, often neither are possible in practice, and so
avoidance of impacts remains key to halting biodiversity declines.
Performance differs among compensation policy design
options. Our results suggest that performance varied substantially
between Averted Loss (i.e. protecting existing vegetation and
averting counterfactual losses) and Improvement (restoring and
protecting land currently void of vegetation) approaches to gen-
erating biodiversity gains (Fig. 2). However, our chosen multi-
pliers—i.e. the amount of compensation required per unit impact
of regulated development—were key in explaining these differ-
ences. Averted Loss multipliers should be set based on counter-
factual biodiversity losses (i.e. those which are avertable), whereas
Improvement multipliers should capture restoration uncertainties
and discount any counterfactual biodiversity gains20,21. However,
in practice, policies employ relatively arbitrary multipliers, set
according to the perceived feasibility of industry delivering on
them22. We too chose arbitrary (yet plausible) multipliers to
enable comparisons among case studies with differing local
conditions. We set an Averted Loss multiplier of four, implying a
counterfactual biodiversity loss of 20%, and as is required by
policy in two of our case studies12,17; and an Improvement
multiplier of two, assuming 50% success rate of restoration, based
on evidence from the restoration ecology literature23–25. These
decisions directly affected the performance of each approach:
Improvement appeared to out-perform Averted Loss consistently
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(Fig. 2). Ultimately, our Averted Loss multiplier was too low to
achieve NNL because counterfactual biodiversity losses were
<20% of the area of compensation and development, while our
Improvement multiplier appeared to perform better (because
counterfactual biodiversity gains were rare) but largely due to our
optimistic (and undifferentiated) assumption of 50% restoration
success (see Methods section for further discussion of this
assumption). Indeed, Averted Loss approaches may outperform
Improvement approaches if rates of restoration success are low
and counterfactual biodiversity gains high. Thus, our results for
Improvement approaches should not be directly compared with
those for Averted Loss approaches and we limit comparisons of
performance to within each approach and discuss the multipliers
that would be required to achieve NNL in later sections (see “Best
performing policies fail to achieve NNL”).
Performance varied among the four types of trades in
biodiversity features between development and compensation
sites (Fig. 2). These trades were done “Out-of-Kind” (where the
biodiversity feature gained through compensation does not need
to be the same kind as that lost to development), “In-Kind”
(where it does), and “Trading-up” (where the biodiversity gained
is of higher conservation priority, being either more rare
(“Trading-up: Rarity”) or at more risk of being lost without
intervention (“Trading up: Additional Gains”; note that both
forms of “trading-up” can also be considered variations of Out-
of-Kind trades). Trading-up: Additional Gains performed best,
due to its explicit goal of protecting areas most at risk of
counterfactual biodiversity losses (when using Averted Loss) and
least likely to undergo counterfactual biodiversity gains (using
Improvement), assuming protection comprehensively prevents
Brigalow Belt,
Australia
Iron Quadrangle,
Brazil
Cabo Delgardo,
Mozambique
East Kalimantan,
Indonesia
0 100 20050 Kilometers
0 50 10025 Kilometers
0 70 14035 Kilometers 0 70 14035 Kilometers
a b
dc
Fig. 1 Four case studies, which differ markedly in regulated development (shown in red) and local conditions. a Brigalow Belt, Australia; b Iron
Quadrangle, Brazil; c East Kalimantan, Indonesia; d Cabo Delgado, Mozambique. Regulated development represents new mining areas and
related infrastructure in the Brigalow Belt and Cabo Delgado; new mining areas in the Iron Quadrangle; and new mining areas and oil palm plantations in
East Kalimantan. See Table 1 for summaries of how local conditions differ among cases.
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any further losses (see Methods section for a discussion of this
assumption). In East Kalimantan and Cabo Delgado, Out-of-
Kind and Trading-up policies performed equally well when using
Improvement because the extent of regulated development and its
required compensation resulted in the restoration of all available
land. Additionally, when using Averted Loss in East Kalimantan,
Trading-up: Additional Gains performed similarly to other trades
because most vegetation had a similar chance of being lost. For
both approaches, the impacts of In-Kind trades are limited in
contexts where insufficient opportunities exist to undertake
compensation, or when vegetation types impacted by develop-
ment are not threatened by other unregulated sectors.
Performance also varied between our three methods for
prioritising compensation activities across the landscape: any-
where “Outside PAs”, outside but “Near PAs”, and strictly
“Within PAs” (Fig. 2). Prioritising compensation Outside PAs
performed better than Near PAs because areas near protection
tended to experience less counterfactual biodiversity losses (thus
reducing impacts of Averted Loss) and more gains (reducing
impacts of Improvement). The exception was for Cabo Delgado,
where prioritising compensation Near PAs performed better,
since existing protected areas occur close to development
pressures, such as roads and urban centres. Prioritising compen-
sation Within PAs was even less effective given that already
protected sites were expected to undergo less counterfactual losses
than sites outside them. Only in two case studies—East
Kalimantan and Cabo Delgado (when using Improvement)—did
protected areas experience some counterfactual losses and contain
some cleared land for restoration. However, even then, these
impacts were much smaller than those achieved by prioritising
compensation elsewhere in the landscape.
Some policies achieved NNL for specific vegetation types
(Supplementary Fig. 1), despite failing to achieve NNL overall
(Fig. 2). Compensation was most likely to achieve NNL for
those vegetation types that would otherwise experience large
counterfactual losses (when using Averted Loss) and small
counterfactual gains (when using Improvement) relative to
impacts of regulated development (Supplementary Methods 1–
4). We also found that some policies had large impacts on a few
vegetation types, while others had small impacts across many.
For example, when using Improvement in the Iron Quadrangle,
In-kind trades came within 5% of achieving NNL of all
vegetation types, whereas Trading-up (targeting Additional
Gains) exceeded NNL by more than 150% for one third of
vegetation types (Supplementary Fig. 1).
Policy performance also depends on local conditions. We also
found that policy performance varied as a result of interactions
between policy design and local conditions. In some case studies,
policy design options were limited by land availability (Table 1;
see Methods section for model assumptions), that is, insufficient
unprotected vegetation to protect for Averted Loss, or cleared
land to restore for Improvement, to allow compensation for all
regulated development simulated over our investigated time-
frame. The effect of land availability was most evident in East
Kalimantan, where we estimated regulated development (for
mining and oil palm expansion) to clear 6311 km2 of forest
(Table 1) and thus require 12,622 km2 of restoration (using
Improvement and our multiplier of 2), an area twice that available
for restoration (Fig. 3). Land availability was even more influ-
ential for less-flexible compensation policies, such as those
requiring In-Kind trades. For example, in Cabo Delgado, even
though a significant amount of land was available for protection
(Table 1), regulated development (for mining and infrastructure
expansion) had the largest impact on deciduous miombo savan-
nah woodlands (WSW28; 2008 km2; Supplementary Fig. 1) and
this vegetation type had the least available land for restoration,
thus compensation (using Improvement) required more than 2.6
times the area available (Fig. 3). In practice, many other factors
further limit opportunities to implement compensation policies,
such as whether land is actually available at the scale required for
NNL. However, our results reveal that to achieve NNL of biodi-
versity, development impacts on biodiversity must cease once
compensation opportunities are exhausted.
Secondly, policy performance reflected the rates of counter-
factual biodiversity losses and gains expected within compensa-
tion sites. Averted Loss performed well when large counterfactual
losses occurred. Such was the case in the Brigalow Belt (Table 1),
where extensive vegetation clearing for cattle grazing was
expected; however, even then, for every hectare of land cleared
by regulated development (i.e. for mining and infrastructure
expansion) compensation (using our multiplier of 4) averted less
than half a hectare of future loss. Conversely, the performance of
policies using Improvement were influenced by counterfactual
biodiversity gains rather than losses; restoring land that would
have otherwise naturally recovered is not additional and so policy
performance was reduced where recovery was more likely. Again,
this was most evident in the Brigalow Belt, where natural
regrowth and recovery is common and, if left to establish for
more than 30 years, can ultimately resemble remnant vegetation
structurally and ecologically17. In subsequent sections, we discuss
Table 1 Differences in local conditions across case studies.
Case study Region extent
(103 km2)
Biodiversity
remaining (%)
Impact of regulated
development on biodiversity
(km2)
Counterfactual
biodiversity loss (km2)
Land available for
compensation (km2)
Improvement Averted Loss
Brigalow Belt,
Australia
26 29 29 225 7383 7623
Iron
Quadrangle, Brazil
19 46 56 208 18,408 7276
East Kalimantan,
Indonesia
127 80 6311 5005 6408 40,514
Cabo Delgado,
Mozambique
77 91 3051 3537 551 5810
Biodiversity remaining indicates the current extent of natural vegetation relative to its pre-clearing extent. Regulated development varies across cases (Fig. 1) and its impact on biodiversity represents the
extent of vegetation cleared by these developments during the simulation time period for each case study. Counterfactual biodiversity losses indicate unregulated vegetation clearing during the
simulation time period. Land available for each compensation approach is defined as either the extent of clear land available for Improvement, or unprotected vegetation available for Averted Loss. Refer
to Supplementary Methods 1–4 for more detail.
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Fig. 2 Our 18 investgated compensation policy options and their impacts on biodiversity. a Policy design options representing two area-based
approaches to achieving biodiversity gains, four options in trading biodiversity between development and compensation sites, and three methods of
prioritising compensation activities to the landscape. Note: we only prioritised compensation Within PAs for Out-of-Kind trades, given that protected areas
contained few opportunities for compensation (i.e. they did not contain much cleared land to restore, or experience large counterfactual losses to avert)
and even more restrictive ‘In-Kind’ trades were rarely possible. Graphs b–e show negative impacts of regulated development (dashed black line,
representing losses) and positive impacts of compensation policy designs (coloured bars, representing gains) on biodiversity (indicated by extent of native
vegetation) across our four case study regions. No Net Loss (NNL) of biodiversity would have occurred if coloured bars met or exceeded dashed black
lines. Coloured bars in b–e match the colour scheme shown in a.
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the multipliers required to achieve NNL under differing local
conditions (see “Best performing policies fail to achieve NNL”).
The influence of local conditions (land available for compensa-
tion and counterfactual biodiversity losses and gains) on policy
performance influenced some biodiversity features more than
others. For example, when regulated development had large
impacts on the vegetation types not threatened by unregulated
development, achieving NNL was not possible with Averted Loss.
Similarly, the spatial distribution of these conditions also
influenced whether prioritising compensation within PAs will
be more or less effective than prioritising compensation elsewhere
across the landscape. Protected areas in the Brigalow Belt and
Iron Quadrangle contained few opportunities to implement
Improvement (i.e. only 4% and 15% was available for restoration,
respectively), and their counterfactual biodiversity losses were
lower, and gains higher, than those outside their protected areas.
In comparison, protected areas in East Kalimantan did experience
counterfactual biodiversity losses (thus prioritising Averted Loss
to them could have averted some loss; Fig. 2), and 6% of areas
protected in Cabo Delgado contained cleared land (thus some
restoration could be undertaken; Fig. 2).
Best performing compensation policy for biodiversity and
ecosystem services. Compensation policies increasingly seek also
to address other goals related to biodiversity, such as securing the
provision of ecosystem services13,14,26 for human wellbeing27,28.
However, rarely do they target both goals (e.g. biodiversity and
ecosystem services) explicitly29. Instead, policies typically target
one goal (e.g. biodiversity) and either assume concomitant
achievement of others, or require minimisation of negative con-
sequences, without directly exploring trade-offs. Further, no
research until now has examined the extent of potential trade-offs
under various policy designs and across varying local conditions.
Here, we found that compensation policies performing best for
biodiversity goals did not necessarily also perform well for two
regulating ecosystem services: carbon storage (indicated by above
ground carbon density) and sediment retention (the retention of
sediment by vegetation, preventing its export to streams). We
evaluated the impacts of biodiversity policy designs on these two
specific ecosystem services because: biodiversity compensation
likely affects them through changes in vegetation, local people in
each case study region valued them30,31, and the data and models
were available to quantify their provision across all case studies
(Supplementary Methods 1–4) thus enabling comparisons
among them.
Impacts of development and biodiversity compensation on
ecosystem services varied widely among policies, with some even
achieving NNL in certain cases. In the Brigalow Belt and Iron
Quadrangle, the biodiversity impacted by development was less
carbon dense than the biodiversity impacted by compensation,
resulting in NNL of carbon storage across all scenarios
(Supplementary Fig. 2). Further, while Improvement performed
better than Averted Loss for biodiversity goals, the opposite was
true for carbon storage because counterfactual vegetation clearing
targeted carbon-dense low-lying fertile lands17. We found similar
results for sediment retention; some policies performed better for
this goal than they did for biodiversity (e.g. Improvement in
Brigalow Belt and Averted Loss in East Kalimantan), but worse
for others (e.g. all policies in Iron Quadrangle and Improvement
approaches in East Kalimantan; Supplementary Fig. 3).
The performance of compensation policies for ecosystem
services depends on the policies’ influence on biodiversity (and
the local conditions explaining this, see previous section) and the
links between biodiversity and ecosystem services at both the
development and compensation sites32. Our results suggest that
different policies likely have widely varying impacts on ecosystem
services, but that performance will also likely differ among
services. Policies with multiple goals should therefore address
each goal explicitly to ensure NNL is achieved for all33. For
example, in East Kalimantan, carbon compensations perform best
when they explicitly target this goal34. Alternatively, information
on known links between goals could inform policy design. For
example, if a trade-off exists between two goals, policies should
seek to minimise this trade-off (e.g. through spatial prioritisation
of compensation activities) and address any additional losses that
it may cause35.
Best performing compensation policies fail to achieve con-
servation goals. None of our investigated compensation policies
achieved NNL of biodiversity—the biodiversity losses caused by
regulated development always exceeded the gains made by
compensation activities (Fig. 2). Requiring larger compensation
multipliers, informed by estimates of counterfactual losses and
gains, is one option to overcome such policy failure12,20. How-
ever, across many of our case studies, the multipliers required to
achieve NNL of native vegetation were large (particularly for
Averted Loss approaches, exceeding a value of 60 in Cabo Del-
gado for Out-of-Kind trades) compared to those often used in
practice22. Implementing such multipliers was not possible in at
least 2 of our 4 case studies (Cabo Delgado and East Kalimantan)
given the limited land available for protection and restoration
(Fig. 3). Other practical limitations of large multipliers may
include negative trade-offs with some ecosystem services, and
difficulty in protecting or restoring vegetation of a comparable
condition to that removed by regulated development. Another
option to achieve NNL is to prevent further development (or at
least their residual biodiversity losses) once compensation options
are exhausted. This could have huge implications for future
development scenarios, for example this strategy of avoidance
could reduce the expansion of mining in Cabo Delgado by half
(Table 1). Designing policies to reflect local conditions may
improve their performance, as even in situations where NNL of
biodiversity and ecosystem services is theoretically achievable,
many other factors may limit them in practice. Such factors may
include conservation effectiveness, governance capacity and long-
term monitoring and management.
Compensation is often proposed as a means to achieving
regional to global-scale conservation goals. However, we found
that even the best performing policies had relatively minor
influence on slowing regional biodiversity loss. Across three of
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Fig. 3 The compensation required to achieve NNL of biodiversity for our
best performing Averted Loss and Improvement policy designs (see
Fig. 2). Numbers above bars show required multipliers, according to our
simulated rates of biodiversity losses and gains. Columns show the required
compensation area relative to the land available for compensation. In two
cases (Cabo Delgado and East Kalimantan), the land required for
compensation exceeds that available for protection or restoration.
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our four case studies, the policies we simulated reduced region-
wide vegetation loss by <10%, relative to counterfactual scenarios,
although in Cabo Delgado, this value reached 37%. Thus, even
with perfectly implemented policies (as we assumed here),
considerable losses still occur (between 3 and 13% of each
region’s native vegetation extent during our analysis period;
Fig. 4). These losses occurred because our compensation policies,
like those worldwide, were narrow in scope—they regulate only a
small proportion of sectors causing biodiversity loss (Supple-
mentary Methods 1–4). When large unregulated losses occur,
compensation can only ever make a relatively small difference in
overall conservation outcomes at broader spatial scales. Note: we
did not assess possible biodiversity losses due to leakage or
displacement of unregulated development from compensation
sites to other parts of the landscape, which could further reduce
the contribution that compensation makes to regional outcomes.
Our findings are consistent with the intent of many
compensation policies globally, which aim to achieve NNL
relative to a counterfactual scenario of without development
and associated compensation10 and, if that scenario is one of
decline, maintaining decline in net terms, albeit at a lower rate,
is the goal. Compensation policies with a narrow scope clearly
have only limited ability to ensure that development goals do
not undermine those of conservation. There are two ways to
reduce this problem, in addition to applying the mitigation
hierarchy to avoid and minimise biodiversity losses where
possible. One is to broaden policy scope, which would force
compensation approaches towards Improvement because fewer
unregulated losses will exist to avert. However, expanding
policy scope will increase compensation requirements, which
our results suggest are already limited by land availability. A
second option is to design policies to achieve biodiversity
targets36,37, rather than to maintain a counterfactual scenario of
decline. This would require more challenging policy decisions
about the division of responsibility for achieving conservation
outcomes between industry and government, but would
improve clarity on how compensation activities contribute to
conservation outcomes.
Implications for compensation policies. Achievement of NNL is
limited by two local conditions that deserve explicit consideration
in compensation policy design: the extent of land available to
implement compensation, and the counterfactual losses and gains
within compensation sites. Our results highlight that Averted
Loss approaches may outperform Improvement approaches when
counterfactual biodiversity losses are high and counterfactual
gains low, so long as sufficient land exists. In-Kind trades achieve
greater gains for the specific vegetation types impacted by regu-
lated development, but will perform similarly well to Out-of-Kind
trades when threats are distributed evenly among types. In gen-
eral, prioritising compensation near existing protected areas will
achieve greater gains in regions where these sites are most
threatened. However, even the best policies seemingly make a
relatively small contribution towards slowing region-wide biodi-
versity loss. Compensation policies also have potential trade-offs
with other conservation goals, such as ecosystem services. Our
findings illuminate the limitations of current compensation
policies; rarely do they address all significant threats to biodi-
versity and expanding their scope to do so would likely require
more land than is available for protection or restoration. While
our results suggest that policy performance may be improved by
ensuring their design aligns with local conditions, expanding
policy scope and requiring larger multipliers will not always be
possible. This leaves impact avoidance—the first step of the
mitigation hierarchy and a non-negotiable task once compensa-
tion opportunities are exhausted—key to halting biodiversity
declines and achieving NNL goals.
Methods
Conceptual framework. Our conceptual framework is shown in Fig. 5. Regulated
development and compensation policies determine the required compensation
activities, which cause biodiversity losses and gains, respectively. Here, we varied
compensation policy settings, according to 18 design options illustrated in Fig. 2,
and measured impacts of both development and required compensation on bio-
diversity (as net impacts relative to a counterfactual scenario). When biodiversity
gains from compensation equalled the biodiversity losses due to development, NNL
was presumed to have occurred. We also investigate the influence of interactions
between policy settings and local conditions on policy performance (i.e. how close
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compensation activities come to achieving NNL goals) by applying our methods to
four case studies that vary substantially in local conditions (Fig. 1; Table 1). Many
other factors likely differ among policies (e.g. implementation and compliance) and
local conditions (e.g. economic costs of acquiring land for compensation), but were
held constant in our analysis.
Modelling approach. We developed a modelling approach (Fig. 6) to quantify the
performance of 18 compensation policy designs (Fig. 2) across our four case
studies.
Step 1: quantify impacts of development on biodiversity. We determined the
extent and spatial distribution of future regulated development (i.e. development
requiring compensation), which differed among case studies (Table 1 and Sup-
plementary Information). In the Brigalow Belt and Iron Quadrangle, current
compensation policies explicitly regulate mining operations (see Supplementary
Methods 1 and 2). In East Kalimantan (Supplementary Methods 3) and Mozam-
bique (Supplementary Methods 4), policies are not yet consistently applied across
entire industries, thus while our definitions of regulated development are illus-
trative, they are also based on policy trends in these countries and the industries
such policies will likely regulate in future. In Mozambique, this included mining
and infrastructure developments, and in East Kalimantan included oil palm
plantations and mining operations given that any primary forest cleared by this
industry is regulated. Adding or removing industries from what we consider to
constitute regulated development would influence our results. Simply including
additional industries would require additional impacts to be compensated.
Including a specific industry could also influence where compensation would be
required across the landscape, particularly for In-Kind trades if industries pre-
ferentially impact particular vegetation types.
Our method for determining the footprint of future regulated development also
differed among case studies. For the Iron Quadrangle and East Kalimantan, we
projected future development using land-use change simulation models (see Step
3). For the Brigalow Belt and Cabo Delgado, we mapped future development using
maps of known proposed projects. We overlaid these regulated development maps
(either simulated or proposed, depending on the case study) with maps of native
vegetation types (our indicator of biodiversity features) to quantify impacts of
development in total and per vegetation type. We assumed development would
completely remove vegetation wherever overlap occurred and would not be
decommissioned and subsequently revegetated during the model simulation
period. See Assumptions and Limitations section below for discussion of potential
implications.
Step 2: allocate compensation to the landscape. We developed a typology of 18
policy design options currently used around the world8,9, representing combina-
tions of two area-based approaches to generating biodiversity gains, four ways of
trading biodiversity features between development and compensation sites and
three methods for prioritising compensation to the landscape (Fig. 2). Under each
policy, we allocated the required amount of compensation (according to set mul-
tipliers for each approach and specified trades) and in the required configuration
(according to trades and prioritisation methods) to the landscape using a model
developed in Dinamica Environment for Geoprocessing Objects (EGO)38 that
allocates compensation as new protected areas based on the constraints specified
above12. Specifically, the model allocates compensation to previously cleared land
for Improvement and to currently unprotected vegetation for Averted Loss. All
compensation was allocated at the start of our simulation time period, rather than
progressively over time. As such, allocation does not consider dynamic land prices
or respond to diminishing land available for compensation. While, in theory,
increasing demand for compensation may increase land prices and thus incentivise
impact avoidance once acquisition costs exceed expected returns from develop-
ment, this dynamic is rarely observed in practice. Instead, when land is scarce,
compensation requirements are often eased. For example, less compensation, or
other forms of compensation, such as investment in ecological research, are often
permitted instead. We did not permit Improvement to restore built-up or indus-
trialised land, given its relatively high acquisition costs and poor prospects for
conversion to a natural state. Compensation could be allocated to any vegetation
type for Out-of-Kind trades and to the same vegetation type for In-kind trades.
Compensation was prioritised to areas of vegetation most likely to be cleared (for
Averted Loss) or least likely to recover (for Improvement) for Trading up: Addi-
tional Gains, and prioritised to the vegetation types with the least of their pre-
clearing extent remaining for Trading up: Rarity. Additionally, these sites were
prioritised for selection either Outside protected areas, Nearby protected areas or
Within protected areas, depending on the policy design combination tested. If
opportunities for compensation were exhausted (i.e. insufficient unprotected
vegetation exists for Averted Loss compensation), allocation of compensation
ceased.
Step 3: simulate counterfactual losses and gains. We examined the perfor-
mance of compensation policies relative to counterfactual scenarios, which we
defined as the unregulated biodiversity losses and gains that would likely occur in
absence of regulated development and their compensation requirements20.
Counterfactual scenarios were simulated using land-use change models12 devel-
oped in Dinamica EGO38, where vegetation clearing indicated biodiversity loss and
revegetation indicated biodiversity gains. Model calibration involved quantifying
historic rates of land use transitions and determining their spatial determinants.
We then used these calibrated models to produce spatial probability maps of land
use transitions. We validated our models by simulating land use transitions during
a second historic time-period and comparing simulated transitions with observed
historic transitions and a null model, using fuzzy logic and an exponential decay
function at multiple spatial resolutions38. Land use transitions, historic rates and
spatial determinants, and model assumptions differed among case studies (Sup-
plementary Methods 1–4); however, all of our calibrated models out-performed
null models and were considered of sufficiently high accuracy for the purpose of
this research.
To simulate counterfactual scenarios, we masked regulated development (Step
1) from current land use maps to prevent counterfactual biodiversity losses and
gains occurring within these areas and used our calibrated models to simulate
future land use according to historic transition rates. We simulated change at
annual time steps and for at least 20 years, noting that timeframes differ among
case studies (Table 2), largely due to data limitations, and mapped counterfactual
losses and gains by overlaying simulated land use maps with native vegetation
types. In doing so, biodiversity losses and gains were quantified over the entire
simulation timeframe, rather than on a per-year basis. Previous studies
investigating temporal dynamics20 show that the benefits of Averted Loss
approaches increase over time (so long as protection averts all future threats) while
the benefits of Improvement approaches decrease over time as natural recovery
occurs. Given that we did not examine temporal dynamics, case studies with longer
time periods include more regulated development than those with shorter time
periods, and correspondingly, more counterfactual biodiversity losses (since all case
studies had an overall declining counterfactual). Differences in timeframes among
cases do not, however, affect the multipliers required to achieve NNL (see Fig. 3),
since regulated development and counterfactual biodiversity losses for each case
study were quantified over the same time period. However, case studies with
shorter time periods had a better chance of achieving NNL of biodiversity because
less compensation was required overall and thus the risk of exceeding land
available for compensation was reduced.
Step 4: quantify compensation impacts and outcomes. We quantified the
impacts of each policy design option by examining counterfactual biodiversity
losses and gains (Step 3) within areas designated for compensation (Step 2). For
Averted Loss, impacts equalled the sum of counterfactual losses within compen-
sation sites, assuming compensation would effectively avert all losses without
displacing them elsewhere (i.e. without leakage; see Assumptions and Limitations
section below). For Improvement, impacts equalled half the area revegetated
(because we assumed a 50% success rate) minus counterfactual gains that occurred
within compensation areas (also assuming no leakage). We quantified total impacts
(i.e. across the case study region) on native vegetation extent and impacts per
vegetation type achieved by compensation by the end of our analysis period.
We also quantified impacts of compensation on two ecosystem services by
modelling spatially explicit above ground carbon storage and sediment retention
for current, pre-clearing, and future landscapes. We obtained above ground carbon
Regulated 
development
Compensation 
activities
Policy settings
(Figure 2)
Biodiversity
+–
Local conditions (Table 1)
Fig. 5 Conceptual framework used to examine the impacts of regulated
development and compensation activities on biodiversity, under various
policy settings and local conditions. We manipulated compensation policy
settings (see Fig. 2), measured their impact on biodiversity across four case
studies that differed in local conditions (Table 1), and compared the
biodiversity gains made by compensation activities to the biodiversity
losses due to regulated development.
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storage maps from various sources (Supplementary Methods 1–4). We mapped
sediment retention using the InVEST Sediment Delivery Ratio tool, a
hydrologically routed RUSLE model that quantifies sediment retained by current
vegetation relative to a cleared (non-vegetated) state39,40. Model parameters
were held constant among case studies (flow accumulation: 2000 [except for in
Cabo Delgado, where we used 500 due to larger spatial resolution of analysis];
Borselli’s kb: 1.8; IC0: 0.5, SDR max: 0.8). We quantified impacts of regulated
development and Averted Loss approaches as the difference between current
and future landscapes within the compensation sites that impacted biodiversity.
For Improvement, impacts equalled half the sum of differences between pre-
clearing and current landscapes within compensation sites that impacted
biodiversity.
Finally, we quantified case-study-wide biodiversity outcomes, as counterfactual
biodiversity losses and gains, minus impacts from regulated development plus
impacts of compensation activities.
Case studies and data sources. We applied our modelling approach to four case
studies: the Brigalow Belt in Queensland, Australia; the Iron Quadrangle in Minas
Gerais, Brazil; East Kalimantan in Indonesia; and Cabo Delgado in Mozambique
(Fig. 1; Supplementary Figs. 5–8). Case studies differed in ways that allowed us to
assess the influence of local context on compensation performance. For example,
they varied in their extent of native vegetation remaining; land use and land use
transitions; and compensation requirements (e.g. policy scope and extent of future
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Fig. 6 Four-step modelling approach used to investigate impacts of regulated development and compensation on biodiversity and ecosystem services.
Step 1. Quantify impacts of regulated development (shown in shaded polygons in box) on biodiversity (here, indicated by the extent of vegetation types –
green shapes in box and on graph). Step 2. Allocate compensation activities (shown as purple polygons in box) to the landscape, according to 18 policy
design options. Step 3. Simulate counterfactual biodiversity losses and gains using land-use change models (black polygons indicate counterfactual losses).
Step 4. Quantify impacts of compensation on biodiversity (shown as green polygons in box on right) and two ecosystem services (using spatial models),
and aggregate their conservation outcomes (i.e. combined impacts of regulated development and compensation, and any counterfactual losses and gains).
Table 2 Timeframes used to calibrate and validate our land use change models, and to simulate counterfactual biodiversity
losses and gains.
Case study Calibration and validation timeframe Counterfactual simulation timeframe
Brigalow Belt 2006, 2009, 2011 5 years 2011–2020 9 years
Iron Quadrangle 2000, 2004, 2010 10 years 2010–2020 10 years
Cabo Delgado 1992, 2004, 2015 23 years 2015–2040 25 years
East Kalimantan 1996, 2006, 2015 19 years 2015–2040 25 years
See Supplementary Methods 1–4 for information on individual case studies, datasets and assumptions.
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regulated development) (Table 1). Supplementary Methods 1–4 and Supplemen-
tary Tables 1–25 contain details of local context for each case study, along with
specific data sources used in our analysis. While beyond the scope of our study, a
theoretical treatment of local conditions, for example using a synthetic landscape
and a sensitivity analysis to vary conditions and measure policy performance, could
more precisely quantify interactions between policy design and local conditions
and thus help provide further insight for optimal compensation design.
Assumptions and limitations of modelling approach. To permit analysis at
broad spatial scales and across multiple case studies, our modelling approach made
several simplifying assumptions, which may influence generalisation of our results.
We used the extent of native vegetation types as our proxy of biodiversity, given
the spatially explicit data available across all case studies. While vegetation types
may adequately indicate other levels of biodiversity (e.g. species, genetic) in some
cases41, this simplification imposes two obvious limitations. First, we were unable
to consider changes in native vegetation condition or degradation because these
data were not available at the extent and resolution required to conduct our
analyses. Compensation policies may perform better when using condition as a
proxy if, for example, development removes already degraded vegetation and
compensation achieves large gains in condition by restoring degraded sites or
averting loss of pristine sites. Evaluating vegetation condition may also affect the
land available for compensation, given that Improvement could also restore
degraded vegetation, rather than being limited to revegetating cleared land. Using
native vegetation extent also overlooks biodiversity losses and gains unrelated to
changes in vegetation extent or condition, such as hunting or poaching.
Incorporating these threats into our analysis may increase compensation
performance in some places. For example, hunting is an important driver of
biodiversity loss within Cabo Delgado’s protected areas and accounting for this
threat would increase the performance of policies prioritising compensation
Within PA. Including other proxies of biodiversity requires additional data, which
does not exist at large spatial scales across all of our case studies; future research
could examine the role of these factors for specific case studies at finer resolutions.
We assumed that regulated development completely removes biodiversity
where it co-occurs with native vegetation. The influence of these assumptions on
our results may differ among case studies, for two reasons. First, differing
development types exist in each case study (i.e. mining in the Iron Quadrangle and
Brigalow Belt, but also transportation corridors in Cabo Delgado and oil palm in
East Kalimantan) and these may have varying impacts on biodiversity. While
mining often requires land clearing for resource extraction, oil palm may house
relatively more biodiversity42,43 and thus cause lower development impacts and
greater compensation performance than reported here. Second, methods used to
model future regulated development differed among case studies (models were
used to simulate regulated losses in the Iron Quadrangle and East Kalimantan,
whereas proposed development footprints were used in the Brigalow Belt and Cabo
Delgado). Since development footprints are generally larger than the vegetation
actually cleared for development, our analysis may overestimate development
impacts or underestimate compensation performance, in these cases and also affect
the land available for compensation. However, this assumption is not expected to
affect the relative impacts of development and compensation (and thus
compensation performance) among policy designs.
We assumed a 50% restoration success rate and thus implemented an
Improvement multiplier of 2. This assumption of restoration success relied on the
restoration ecology literature, which suggests that between a third and one half of
restoration projects may be successful23,24, although sometimes success rates fall far
below these rates, as is the case with seagrass restoration44. However, these reviews
also reveal that when projects attempt to establish new habitat (as opposed to
enhancing existing habitat), as is the case for compensation activities investigated
in our study, and new habitats must resemble a similar condition to a reference site
by a set time period, success rates are reduced even further – so our assumption is
generous. While there is currently a great lack of evidence of restoration success in
the offsetting context45, recent studies suggest typically used multipliers are far
from sufficient to overcome the risks of project failure19,34. Supplementary Figure 4
illustrates the effect of two alternative success rates (25% and 75%) on
compensation impacts on biodiversity. Increasing success to 75% increased the
impact of compensation and, when holding the multiplier at 2, some policy designs
achieved NNL in some cases (Supplementary Fig. 4). Further research on the
success of restoration (particularly informed by field studies examining real
offsetting projects) is needed to better inform these assumptions. This includes an
understanding of how success differs among habitat types, modes of restoration
and types of initial disturbance25. Not only would this information permit more
certainty in policy evaluations, but also to inform the multipliers required to
achieve NNL, which rapidly decline as success improves.
Given the large extent of our study regions and the assumptions of our
modelling methodology (Fig. 6), our results are likely influenced by several sources
of uncertainty. While parameter values used by our compensation policies (i.e.
multipliers and compensation success) are based on current practice, these likely
vary across and among sites. Further, errors are likely evident in the many datasets
used to calibrate and validate our land use change models (which were then used to
simulate counterfactual biodiversity losses and gains) and ecosystem services
models (used to examine trade-offs from biodiversity compensation). These data
include land use maps, created by classifying satellite imagery and thus influenced
by atmospheric conditions as well as errors in classification models, and spatial
determinants of change (such as topography, and roads and river networks).
Further, some of these sources of uncertainty may also interact with one another,
causing errors to propagate throughout our analysis, particularly when simulating
future counterfactual scenarios. While we could quantify some of these sources of
uncertainty (indeed we discuss the influence of some of these sources in the main
text), a comprehensive assessment was deemed beyond our study scope. For this
reason, our results should not be used to develop specific policies in any case study,
but instead used to guide high-level policy development and inform more precise
evaluations in specific case studies.
Reporting summary. Further information on research design is available in
the Nature Research Reporting Summary linked to this article.
Data availability
Supplementary Dataset 1 contains a summary of our modelled results. GIS outputs (i.e.
maps of land use change and compensation activities) are available from the
corresponding author (L.J.S.) on request. All third party datasets accessed for use in this
work are available via the citations provided in the main manuscript and Supplementary
Information (specifically: Supplementary Table 3 for Brigalow Belt, Supplementary
Table 7 for Iron Quadrangle, Supplementary Table 13 for East Kalimantan and
Supplementary Table 19 for Cabo Delgado).
Code availability
We used Dinamica EGO (version 4) to model land use change scenarios (available for
free here: https://csr.ufmg.br/dinamica/) and the InVEST sediment model (version 3.2)
to quantify the impact of compensation of sediment retention (available for free here:
https://naturalcapitalproject.stanford.edu/software/invest).
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